Absence-of-Arbitrage (AoA) is the basic assumption underpinning derivatives pricing theory. As part of the OTC derivatives market, the CDS market not only provides a vehicle for participants to hedge and speculate on the default risks of corporate and sovereign entities, it also reveals important market-implied default-risk information concerning the counterparties with which financial institutions trade, and for which these financial institutions have to calculate various valuation adjustments (collectively referred to as XVA) as part of their pricing and risk management of OTC derivatives, to account for counterparty default risks. In this study, we derive No-arbitrage conditions for CDS term structures, first in a positive interest rate environment and then in an arbitrary one. Using an extensive CDS dataset which covers the 2007-09 financial crisis, we present a catalogue of 2,416 pairs of anomalous CDS contracts which violate the above conditions. Finally, we show in an example that such anomalies in the CDS term structure can lead to persistent arbitrage profits and to nonsensical default probabilities. The paper is a first systematic study on CDS-term-structure arbitrage providing model-free AoA conditions supported by ample empirical evidence.
Introduction
Derivative pricing theory has as its basic assumption that the financial markets are arbitrage-free, in the sense that there should not exist an opportunity to make a risk-free profit without initial setup costs. With an appropriate mathematical definition (a non-trivial matter, especially in a continuoustime framework: see for example Delbaen and Schachermayer (2006, [16] ), Absence-of-Arbitrage can be shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equivalent martingale measure with respect to which prices can be evaluated as expectations of discounted pay-offs: see for example Bjork [5] (2005).
The Over-The-Counter or OTC derivatives represent a market with a notional of US$532 trillion (BIS Statistics [2] , 2017), including derivatives on foreign exchange, interest rates, commodities, credit, equities and other derivatives. As part of OTC derivatives market, the Credit Default Swap (or CDS) not only allows participants to speculate on and hedge credit risks, it also reveals market-implied default-risk information about financial institutions' counterparties. The latter is critical for the pricing and risk-management of OTC derivatives (especially for non-centrally cleared ones), in order to properly account for counterparty credit risk in the form of Credit Valuation Adjustment or CVA and other valuation adjustments collectively referred to as XVA: see for example Brigo, Morini and Pallavicini [6] (2013). One of the main lessons learned from the 2007-09 financial crisis is that the market failed to properly account for counterparty default risks in the pricing and risk management of OTC derivatives. A lot of progresses have been made in this area since the crisis 1 . In practice, the post-crisis pricing and risk management of OTC derivatives in banks consist of two parts, risk-neutral valuation of the derivative by the Front Office assuming 1 See for example Brigo, Francischello and Pallavicini for non-linear valuation adjustment pricing framework (2015, [9] ), Crepey et al (2013, [14] ) for a BSDE-based (Backward stochastic differential equation) approach and Burgard and Kjaer (2013, [13] ) for a replicating approach for FVA; Green, Kenyon and Dennis (2014, [17] ) and Green and Kenyon (2015, [18] ) among others extended the replicating approach to include capital and margin requirements in forms of KVA (Capital Valuation Adjustment) and MVA (Margin Valuation Adjustment) respectively.
there is no counterparty-default-risk, and the addition of an array of valuation adjustments conducted by the XVA Desk, also computed by risk-neutral valuation in risk-neutral world. Valuation adjustments have become standard practice in pricing and risk management of OTC derivatives for most large banks.
Literature often highlights that a CVA can be seen as a Contingent CDS or CCDS (cf. Brigo, Morini and Pallavicini [6] , 2013), which pays the Loss-Given-Default on the residual net present value of a given portfolio. A CCDS is a type of credit derivatives whose notional and maturity are contingent on the time-of-default of an underlying reference entity. To price the CVA or CCDS, the default risk of the reference entity has to be calibrated to liquid CDS rates in a presumably arbitrage-free market. However, this element of the CVA pricing has not received much attention; essentially, the literature typically assumes that the counterparties of financial institutions either have liquidly quoted CDSs contracts on their names, or that sound proxies are available and that the CDS market is arbitrage-free. However, as regards the former assumption, as highlighted in Brummelhuis and Luo (2018a) [10] , the vast majority of counterparties of financial institutions are not liquidly quoted in the CDS market and CDS proxy rates have to be constructed. In that reference, a CDS-proxy construction method via Machine Learning techniques has been proposed and shown to be more sound and to produce more accurate results than existing proxy methods:
see Brummelhuis and Luo (2018b) [11] , for a benchmarking exercise. Regarding the latter, as shown below, the CDS market is not as arbitrage-free as assumed in derivatives pricing theory; in fact, a significant amount of CDS-term-structure arbitrage opportunities exist in the CDS market.
Alternatively, interested readers can find a shorter version of the paper for ML-based CDS Proxy Construction in Brummelhuis and Luo (2017 [12] ).
Using simple arguments we show that, for CDS contracts of varying maturity on a given name, the CDS-spread times the maturity has to be an increasing function of the maturity. This can be shown without making any modeling assumptions if the risk-free interest rates are positive. When risk-free rates can be negative we derive a version of this theorem in which we multiply the CDSspreads not by the maturity, but by what we will call the standardized risk-free annuity, which is the present value of an annuity paying a standardized interest rate of 1 over the life-time of the CDS contract (at the same payment dates as the CDS). In the case of positive interest rates this strengthens the first condition above, but its derivation assumes the existence of an equivalent martingale measure or risk-neutral pricing measure 2 and the conditional independence of default-times of the other market variables. These assumptions also underlie current standard practice in banks for deriving market-implied (or risk-neutral) default probabilities from CDS quotes by the so-called
Bootstrapping approach (see for example O'Kane (2008), [21] ) as well as the evaluation of CVAs.
We then found that these absence-of-arbitrage conditions can be violated in CDS markets: see subsection 1.1 and section 4 below.
Despite the uniquely important role played by the CDS market, there are only a limited number of studies on CDS-related arbitrage: see Kapadia and Pu (2012, [20] ) for an example regarding arbitrage between CDS and equity markets and Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2012, [1] ) for an example on arbitrage between CDS and bond markets. A recent study by Jarrow et al (2018, [19] ) focused on statistical arbitrages in the CDS term structure by identifying mis-pricing of CDSs based on the gaps between theoretical CDS prices and observed ones; their results however are modeldependent, contrary to ours.
There are potential implications of CDS-term-structure arbitrage for the pricing and risk management of both credit derivatives and general OTC derivatives, because of the requirement to compute the valuation adjustments. Given the importance of the No-arbitrage assumption in deriving default probabilities from observed CDS curves in a presumably efficient CDS market, it is important to understand to what extent this market is arbitrage-free. Do we see potential arbitrage opportunities and are these being taken advantage of by arbitrageurs? As we will see, the answers to this are, respectively, a "yes" and a "no". These questions are of fundamental importance for the pricing and risk management of credit derivatives and XVA.
In the remainder of this introductory section we first present an overview of anomalous CDS trades which violate the simplest of our No-arbitrage conditions and which motivated our study.
We then more formally list the research gaps we identified and the contributions we believe this paper makes to the existing literature.
Anomalous CDS term structures
Let s 1 and s 2 be the mid-point CDS spreads of two co-initial standard single-name CDS contracts starting at T 0 with maturities T 1 < T 2 but otherwise being identical 3 . According to Theorem 1 in section 2, Absence-of-Arbitrage (AoA) in the CDS market implies that:
We will call the pair of CDS trades for which (1) is violated an Arbitrage Trade or more briefly an
Anomaly. Note that in that case, necessarily s 1 > s 2 , so the CDS curve is inverted. Inverted yield curves are well-studied by researchers but inverted CDS curves have not attracted much attention from researchers. O'Kane (2008, [21] ) remarked that model-independent arbitrage may exist in the CDS market and that negative implied default probabilities can occur for inverted CDS curves.
He stated a condition similar to (1) but in a form and with a derivation which suggests it is only holds approximatively, while it is in fact exact. Brigo and Mercurio [8] (2006) also commented on the possibility of negative hazard rates as a result of inverted CDS curves. However, no systematic study has been conducted to assess the significance of this an issue and its implications for OTC derivatives.
In the case of an anomaly violating (1) as described above, an arbitrageur would simultaneously sell the protection against the default of an entity ("Short the CDS") for a rate s 1 over the period of T 1 − T 0 and buy the default protection against the same entity ("Long the CDS") for a rate of s 2 over the period T 2 − T 0 . We refer to this as a paired arbitrage trade, denoted informally by
We now turn to identify potential arbitrage opportunities by checking a list of paired trades (19) . We note that
• As regards regions, the North American region has higher percentage (86%) of anomalies than others. We believe this is mainly due to two reasons: in our CDS data sample, 64% of CDS trades have their underlying entities operating in this region; furthermore, the sample period of our CDS data includes the on-going financial crisis that affected the North American region more than the others regions, which may have contributed to the observed higher proportion of anomalies for the region. 4 See National Bureau of Economic Research: http://www.nber.org/cycles.html for a definition of US economic cycles 5 We avoid data manipulations such as term interpolations to ensure that our data truly reflect the CDS market. • Regarding sector groups, the 2,229 anomalies in the Non-banking sector corresponds to 92.3% of the total number of anomalies.
• As for rating groups, 1,863 or 77.1% anomalies are associated with Investment-grade debt, leaving the remaining non-negligible number of anomalies associated with either Non-investmentgrade or Not-rated debt. For reasons which are further discussed in section 4, non-negligible numbers of anomalies are associated with either AAA-rated (36) or AA-rated (222) names.
• With regard to seniority, almost all anomalies are associated with either senior or senior secured debt, suggesting debt seniority type (junior versus senior) may not be a determining factor explaining the existence of anomalies in our sample.
To sum up, we have presented a cross-sectional overview of CDS-term-structure arbitrage opportunities identified in this study; in section 4, we present further evidences of such anomalies across time and discuss the implications.
Research Gaps and Contributions
Before we move to the next section, we present a summary of the research gaps which motivated our study and list the contributions we believe this study makes to literature.
Research gaps
We identified the following research gaps in existing literature: for a CDS curve to be arbitrage free.
Contributions
We summarize the main contributions of our paper:
1. The paper represents the first systematic study of CDS-term-structure arbitrage on the basis of a simple model-independent criterion for No-arbitrage, supported by empirical evidence and numerical examples based on real data.
2. The No-arbitrage conditions we derive are basically model-independent, assuming at most the existence of an equivalent martingale measure, and sometimes not even that.
3. It shows that violating these conditions can lead to either negative or greater-than-1 conditional default probabilities, which has implications for the pricing and risk management of both credit derivatives and OTC derivatives in general, through the computation of value adjustments such as CVA and DVA.
4. It argues that an explanation of these apparent arbitrage opportunities can be found in the presence of implicit risks and costs which were systematically neglected in the practice of OTC-derivatives pricing prior to the crisis of 2008-9 and which have since become the focus of research efforts of academics, and practitioners through the inclusion of various valuation adjustments, and that taking these into account in the calculation of CDS spreads should reduce arbitrage opportunities in the CDS market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we derive the No-arbitrage condition
(1) for a CDS term structure with zero modelling assumptions, under the assumption that risk-free rates are non-negative. We do this first (by way of example) for a simple three period model, and then for the continuous time case with both continuous and discrete protection payments.
In section 3, we use the existence of an Equivalent martingale Measure to derive a No-arbitrage condition for a general interest rate environment, with potentially negative short rates, which generalizes (1) if interest rates are positive. In section 4 we present further empirical evidence for CDS-term-structure anomalies and the existence of arbitrage profits. We present numerical examples of the implications of such anomalies for conditional default probabilities. Finally, section 5 concludes.
No-arbitrage conditions on CDS Term Structure
We consider a co-initial family of CDS contracts providing protection against the default of a reference entity between times T 0 and T for arbitrary T > T 0 . The default protection seller pays the buyer the Loss-Given-Default should the default occur within [T 0 , T] in exchange for either a continuously or discretely paid spread of s t (T 0 ; T), which is fixed at the inception of the contract and paid by the buyer up till time-of-default τ or up till the contract's maturity T, whichever is smaller. Here t < T 0 is the time at which the spread is agreed upon between the two parties of the CDS. We are interested in potential static arbitrage opportunities presented by the CDS term structure or CDS curve {s t (T 0 , T) : T ≥ T 0 } at any fixed time t, which, without loss of generality,
we can take to be t = 0 (corresponding to "today" or "now"). Dynamic No-arbitrage conditions for the stochastic evolution of these curves as function of t are outside of the scope of the present paper.
No-arbitrage condition for discretely paid CDS rates: a simple example
We first look at a simple discrete time model, with times 0, 1, 2 and 3. To further simplify, we assume that interest rates are 0 (this will be relaxed in the next section). Suppose that the defaultable bond underlying the CDS contract is a 0-coupon bond with maturity T = 3 and nominal value 1, and that the reference entity has a strictly positive risk-neutral probability of default before maturity. We assume of course that the entity has not yet defaulted at the trade date t = 0 of the contract:
Consider two CDS contracts, CDS 1 and CDS 2 , both starting at time t = 1 (the Effective Date of the CDS) with CDS 1 providing protection against default at t = 2 for a spread of s 1 , and the second contract, CDS 2 , providing protection against default at times t = 2 and t = 3 for a spread of s 2 . The spreads are agreed upon at time 0, and therefore known. Let R τ ∈ [0, 1) be the, possibly random, recovery-upon-default at the time-of-default, which we assume to be strictly positive.
Suppose that s 1 ≥ s 2 , corresponding to an inverted CDS curve with short-term protection being more expensive than long-term one, and that we short the first CDS, in the sense that we sell protection against default at time T 2 for a fee of s 1 payable
It is instructive to examine the above example from the viewpoint of risk-neutral pricing. Let Q be an equivalent martingale measure and suppose that the conditional risk-neutral probabilities of default over each period are constant:
while Q(τ > 0) = 1. Furthermore, assume that the loss-given-defaults L t > 0 at t = 2, 3 are constant; if the reference entity for the CDS is a zero-coupon bond of face value 1, then L t = 1−R t .
We will see that if (2) holds, then λ either has to be negative or strictly bigger than 1. The fair value at time 0 of the first spread is determined by
The equation for the fair value of the second spread is
, and condition (2) would imply that s 1 − 2s 2 = −λL < 0, or λ < 0, and our risk-neutral pricing model for pricing the CDS would break down.
More generally, letting x := L 3 /L 2 , we find that
and the condition that s 1 − 2s 2 > 0 forces λ to be either strictly smaller than 0 or bigger than 1. (If λ > 0, then the second factor of the product on the right has to be strictly negative, which forces λ > 1, while if λ < 1, λ has to be negative because of the first factor; note that x > 0 since L 1 and
Another way of deriving that Absence of Arbitrage implies that s 1 ≤ 2s 2 is by observing that the risk-neutral expectation at time 0 of the pay-off of the difference of the two CDS contracts ("short s 1 , long s 2 ") is
Since this has to be 0, and since the last term is positive, it follows that
which certainly implies that s 1 ≤ 2s 2 , since Q(τ > 2) ≤ Q(τ > 1). Note that (3) is sharper than s 1 ≤ 2s 2 but that the latter makes no reference to survival probabilities. Inequality (3) would be useful when we would have access to survival probabilities from another source than the CDSs themselves, e.g. from defaultable bond yields.
No-arbitrage conditions for continuously paid CDS rates
We now put ourselves in a continuous-time framework, and consider a family of co-initial forward CDS contracts providing default-protection over a future time periods [T 0 , T], with T 0 ≥ 0 fixed and T > T 0 arbitrary. We let τ be the time of default. The party which is long the CDS (the buyer of the default protection) will pay a protection fee between T 0 and T up till default of the reference entity, in which case he will receive the Loss-given-default (LGD). We will consider both the case of a protection fee which is paid out continuously and one which is paid discretely, at payment
In the first case the protection buyer pays a continuous fee at a rate of sdt up till time-of-default, and in the second case he pays s(t i − t i−1 ) at time t i for i = 1, . . . , n, with t n := T if t i ≤ τ, while he only pays the spread over [t i−1 , τ] if default τ occurs between t i−1 (excluded) and t i (included).
Here the CDS spread s = s 0 (T 0 , T) is determined at time 0 so that if T 0 > 0 it is in fact a forward spread.
Let (L t ) t≥0 be the loss-given-default or LGD process, with L t the LGD if default happens at t. In some of our results below L t is allowed to be stochastic, in which case we will if necessary assume it is adapted to the relevant filtrations generated by background processes such as the interest rate process. We assume that, for all t > 0, L t is non-negative, and strictly positive with a non-zero probability: E(L t ) > 0, where the expectation can be taken with respect to the objective probability measure, or an equivalent risk-neutral probability, if one exists. We will sometimes limit ourselves to
LGDs which are known in advance, though possibly time-dependent, in which case we will write L(t) instead of L t . Finally, we let (r t ) t≥0 be the risk-free short-rate process.
Our first result generalizes the absence-of-arbitrage condition of the previous section to the continuous-time setting, under condition of non-negative short-rates. Theorem 1. Suppose that the risk-free short rate r t ≥ 0 a.s. and that T 0 < τ ≤ T 2 with positive (objective) probability. If there is no arbitrage in the CDS market, and if the protection fee is paid out continuously, then (T − T 0 )s(T 0 , T) is a strictly increasing function of T > T 0 :
The same inequality holds with discretely paid protection fees, provided the protection-payment dates of the two CDS contracts between T 0 and T 1 coincide.
Proof. Recall that an arbitrage opportunity over the time-horizon [0, T] is a process (X t ) t≥0 rep-resenting a dynamic self-financing portfolio strategy which is bounded from below and has initial cost X 0 = 0, while at T, X T ≥ 0 a.s. and X T > 0 with strictly positive probability. Suppose now that (4) is not satisfied for some T 1 < T 2 :
where we have written s 1 := s(T 0 , T 1 ) and s 2 := s(T 0 , T 2 ), to simplify notations. Then, necessarily,
We set up a portfolio strategy at time 0 by shorting the CDS for [T 0 , T 1 ] and going long the one for [T 0 , T 2 ], and investing any cash earned into a savings account (as usual interpreted as borrowing if the amount is negative). This strategy costs 0 to set up. We verify that its value at T 2 is non-negative with positive expectation.
(i) Continuous protection payments. If default happens before or at T 0 , both contracts are cancelled, and we receive nothing. If default happens before or at T 1 , the default payments of the two CDS contracts will cancel out, and the value of our position at T 2 will be
where
is the savings account. If default occurs between T 1 (excluded) and T 2 (included), we receive
assuming (5), where we used that the risk-free rate is non-negative for the third line, so that B t,T 2 ≥
, we receive the next to last line minus the LGD-term, which again is a non-negative amount. Since default will occur in (T 0 ,
with a positive probability, our gain at T 2 is non-negative and strictly positive with a positive probability, and since the value of our position is clearly bounded from below at intermediary times (it is in fact non-negative at all times by essentially the same arguments), we have an arbitrage opportunity. Note that our strategy is in fact a static one.
(ii) Discrete protection payments. Let T 0 < t 1 < · · · < t n 1 = T 1 be the payment dates for the CDS contract over (T 0 , T 1 ], which is augmented by payment dates T 1 < t n 1 +1 < · · · < t n 2 = T 2 for the CDS over (T 0 , T 2 ]. If default has not yet happened at t i , then the protection fee for the sub-period
] is payed at t i+1 . If s is the CDS-spread, his protection fee equals to s(t i+1 − t i ) if default has not yet occurred before t i+1 , or s(τ − t i ) if default occurred after t i but before or at t i+1 . This can be summarized by the formula
where a ∧ b := min(a, b). With this notation, the value of our strategy at T 2 is
This value is clearly positive if τ ≤ T 1 , since s 1 > s 2 , while if T 1 < τ ≤ T 2 , it is bounded from below by
where we used that B t i+1 ,T 2 ≥ B T 1 ,T 2 if i < n 1 and B t i+1 ,T 2 ≤ B T 1 ,T 2 otherwise. We therefore have an arbitrage if inequality (4) is violated.
Remark 2. The theorem remains valid if, in the discrete case, protection payments are made at the time of default instead of at the end of the protection period in which default falls: this simply amounts to replacing B t i+1 ,T 2 by B t i+1 ∧τ,T 2 in the proof above, which can be bounded from above or below as before.
Also, we can slightly weaken our assumption on the payment dates of the two CDS contracts, by supposing that the first contract has a set of payment dates {T 0 < u 1 < u 2 < · · · < u n 1 = T 1 } which contain the payment dates {T 0 < T 1 < · · · < t n 1 < T 1 } of the second contract with spread s 2 for that period, while T 1 is a payment date for the second contract.
Indeed, suppose that T 1 > t i = u k < u k+1 < · · · < u −1 < u = t i+1 and that τ > t i . If no default occurs between t i and t i+1 , then the value at T 2 of our net protection payment for the period
while if the time of default τ falls within this period, a similar analysis shows that this net value is bounded from below by
Arguing as before, we find that we have an arbitrage opportunity if (4) does not hold.
Absence-of-Arbitrage conditions between CDS-rates and nondefaultable bond prices
The proof of Theorem 1 above is completely elementary. We will now give a second proof which uses the fundamental theorem of asset pricing, and which will also allow us to generalize this theorem to the case where the risk-free rate can become negative. We will do so under a stronger assumption than Absence-of-Arbitrage, namely the existence of an equivalent martingale measure (or risk-neutral pricing measure) Q with respect to which the time-of-default τ and the riskfree short-rate process (r t ) t≥0 are independent. In other words, we assume a reduced-form credit risk model. An equivalent martingale measure exists assuming a suitably strengthened form of Absence-of-Arbitrage, such as Delbaen and Schachermayer's NFLVR condition (1994, [15] ). We will moreover assume, for a start that the protection is paid out continuously, at a rate of s 0 (T 0 , T), and make some remarks on the case of discrete protection payments at the end of this section.
Denoting the risk-neutral survival probability by
the fair CDS spread at time 0 can these assumptions be expressed as
where P 0,t := E Q e − t 0 r u du is the price at time 0 of a non-defaultable 0-coupon bond maturing at t.
Remark 3. If L t =: L(t) is deterministic, the numerator equals
This formula will still hold, with L(t) := E Q (L t ) if the LGD process is also independent of (r t ) t , For actual
LGDs, such as those turning up in CVA calculations, the LGD is related to the present value, at time-of-default, of future discounted cash-flows, and would therefore in general depend on the short-rate process. If the CDS-contract sets the LGD is as a fixed fraction of a given nominal, it is clearly constant.
To obtain a variant of Theorem 1 which holds if risk-free rates can be negative, it now suffices to replace (T − T 0 ) by what we will call the standardized (continuous-time) risk-free annuity
Theorem 2. Assume an equivalent martingale measure exists for the CDS market with respect to which τ and (r t ) t≥0 are independent. Then A 0 (T 0 , T)s 0 (T 0 , T) is an increasing function of T.
Proof. Writing A(T) and s(T) for A 0 (T 0 , T) and s 0 (T 0 , T), and also introduce
which is what we might call a defaultable standardized annuity. Then clearly is increasing in T, since 1 T 0 <τ≤T is, so it suffices to show that
since q(t) is decreasing, and therefore
Remark 4. Theorem 2 implies Theorem 1 (modulo the stronger independence assumptions of the former), since
is an increasing function of T if the short-rate is non-negative a.s., since P 0 (t) is then decreasing in t ≥ 0: this can be shown similarly by verifying that the derivative of the logarithm is non-negative.
Note that in this case, the conclusion of Theorem 2 is stronger than the one of Theorem 1 (see also the graphical interpretation of these Absence-of-Arbitrage relations below). An advantage however of (4) is that it is formulated purely in terms of the CDS spreads, without reference to the risk-free yield curve.
A No-Arbitrage relation between CDS and IRS rates
We can reformulate Theorem 2 as a no-arbitrage relation in terms (continuously paid) Interest
Rate Swaps (IRS) rates. Recall that the fair (forward) rate for a continuously exchanged fixed-forfloating IRS over [T 0 , T] is given by 
is increasing in T ≥ T 0 .
One can go one step further, and express F 0 (T 0 , T) in terms of the IRS-forward rates: see Appendix A. This however involves a double integration of IRS-rates with respect to their maturity variables, and the corollary suffices in practice, since we can observe forward bond-prices along with forward IRS rates.
Graphical interpretation of the No-Arbitrage relations
The No-arbitrage condition of Theorem 1 has a simple graphical interpretation: suppose we have a collection of observed rates s i = s(T 0 , T i ) and that we plot the points s i against x i := T i − T 0 in the (x, s)-plane. Take a point (x a , s a ) and draw the hyperbola s = C/x a which passes through this point (so that C = x a · s a ). Then all points (x i , s i ) for which x i ≥ x a should lie above this hyperbola, if not, there is an opportunity for arbitrage.
In Figure 1 , a CDS curve highlighted in orange color is plotted against a hyperbola going through the (x a , s i ) where x a = 0.5 and s a = 400 basis points. Clearly, together with s a , any points s i located below the hyperbola can form a paired trade to construct arbitrage opportunity as in the proof of Theorem 1, which makes it easy to detect such arbitrage opportunities at a glance.
Alternatively, one can do a log-log plot: log s i against log x i , in which case the points (log x i , log s i ) for which log x i > log a i should lie above the straight line with slope -1 which passes through (log x a , log s a ). The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates the graphical interpretation for Theorem 1 in log-log scale.
A similar construction applies for Theorem 2: it suffices to plot s i against
respectively log s i against log A i .
Discrete protection payments
In practice, the protection leg of a CDS is paid discretely instead of continuously. If we consider families of co-initial CDS-contracts with maturities and protection payment dates coming from a discrete set of tenor-dates T 0 < T 1 < · · · < T n < · · · , then the protection buyer of a CDS contract whose maturity is T n pays s(
hasn't occurred yet, and
One can repeat the analysis to arrive at the following result:
be the discrete-time standardized annuity, and let s n := s(T 0 , T n ) be the fair CDS spread. Then Theorem 3. If an equivalent martingale measure exists and if τ is independent of the risk-free interest rate process, then A n s n is an increasing function of n.
Proof. The fair spread now equals
and it again suffices to verify that A n /A d n is increasing in n. Now an easy computation shows that
, where
It follows that (Q(T
and therefore
and each term in the sum in the numerator is positive since (Q(
One checks by a similar computation that if interest rates are non-negative, and P 0,T n therefore is decreasing in n, then (T n − T 0 )/A n divided by the numerator is increasing in n, so that we find as in section 2 that (T n − T 0 )s n is increasing.
Economists often cite inverted yield curves as signals for a pending economic crisis. However, inversions for CDS-curves does seem not to have been systematically investigated in the literature.
In this section we present some further evidence for CDS anomalies summarized across the sample period of our CDS data. We consider the implications of such anomalies for conditional default probabilities.
CDS-term-structure anomalies across time
In section 1.1, we presented a cross-sectional overview of the CDS-term-structure arbitrages (or anomalies) which fail the No-arbitrage condition of Theorem 1.
We now take a further look at these anomalies across the same sample period using the same CDS data set, where we consider contracts with T 0 = 0, that is, starting on the day they are quoted.
It is convenient to introduce the Maturity Adjusted Spread Ratio or MAR, defined as
so that Theorem 1 there is arbitrage for the pair of traded if MAR > 1. Equivalently, there is arbitrage if the slope s(T 1 )/s(T 2 ) is bigger than or equal to the maturity ratio T 2 /T 1 . The MAR is a metric for the strength of such an arbitrage opportunity. On the basis of these two figures and on Figure 4 and Table 2 , we can make the following observations:
1. We can distinguish three different phases in the anomalies count of Figure 2 onwards during which, as funding and market liquidity recovered, the number of anomalies increased as the market searched for directions amongst ongoing uncertainty, in part related to regulatory reforms hanging over the financial markets. According to Battalio and Schultz (2011, [3] ), regulatory confusion and uncertainty created significant bid-ask spreads in the equity option market, and the CDS market was not immune from this either.
2. Figure 2 shows that 8 out of the 12 peak-months (highlighted in Red) coincide with the "Roll Months", which are the months containing so-called Roll Dates 9 . During the Roll Months, the increased number of anomalies can at least partly be attributed to an increased number of expiring and lack of liquid CDS contracts before the Roll Dates.
3. Across the four different arbitrage strategies of Figure 3 , the '6m-1yr' maturity pair had the '2yr-5yr' pair we found 151 arbitrage opportunities and for the '5yr-10yr' pair, 388. In our data set, CDS-curve arbitrage opportunities occurred most frequently at the short-end of the curve and less frequently for the longer maturity contracts, and the least for 5-year term contracts which are the most liquidly traded. These observations are consistent with an economic principle: when a name gets stressed, its CDS curve often gets inverted at the short-end (such as the 6-month maturity) of the curve and tends to go back to be normally upward-sloping after that. This is because investors tend to believe that if a stressed name survives in the short-term, it will bounce back over longer terms.
4. Figure 3 also depicts the MARs in contrast with the reference line (y = 1 indicated by a dark dotted line); as explained above, the greater the (monthly average) MAR number exceeds the reference line, the stronger or the more arbitrage-able the arbitrage opportunity can be.
Also, MARs tend to be less volatile than the anomaly counts, except for some outliers. For Table 2 : Arbitrageability/MARs across strategies and rating groups: numerical results example, the spike of 16.53 in the MARs shown in Table 2 for the '2yr-5yr' couple is caused 5. In Table 2 , we present the average MAR of the anomalies for the four maturity pairs split out by rating class. We excluded one anomalous trade related to Freddie Mac as an outlier from the '1yr-2yr' and '2yr-5yr' pairs because it was rated AAA even as it received the US government's bailout. Figure 4 and Table 2 show that the MAR tends to increase when we go from higher credit-quality ratings groups (AAA) to lower ones ( BBB or Non-investmentGrade rated group (or NIG, ratings lower than), with the exception of the A-rated group for all four strategies. This may be related to an observation of Biswas, Nikolova and Stahel (2015, [4] ), who found that CDS contracts on lower rated entities commanded a higher liquidity premium. Such liquidity premia would disincentivise would-be arbitrageurs to take advance of these arbitrage opportunities since it would make it costly to close out the arbitrage strategy prematurely should they wish to do so, explaining why such opportunities are tolerated by the market. . The Mark-to-Market value is zero on 03/12/2008, but raises to a strictly positive value immediately afterwards, and consistently stays overshoots the 10-year rate (brown) can be observed later in the period. The 5-year rate is more volatile than the 10-year one, which is probably related to its greater liquidity. In particular, this
indicates that arbitrage opportunities like these are not one-offish, instead, they can be recurrent.
Implications of Arbitrage: Nonsensical Default Probabilities
As or hazard rates from a given CDS curve. Table 3 shows that the bootstrapped hazard rates for 4-year and 7-year terms for Microsoft are negative; also, the bootstrapped 1-year hazard rate for AIB is negative (highlighted in red colors). In both cases, this violates the elementary definition of a probability. Figure 7 depicts the same numerical results in a graph.
CDS Term Structure and Credit Valuation Adjustment
We discuss the relation between CDS term structure arbitrage opportunities and CVA. In one direction, the risk-neutral hazard rates and default probabilities which are used for the computation In the other direction, CVA costs can provide an explanation for why these arbitrage oportunities are not exploited. Indeed, the would-be arbitrageur faces two kinds of counterparty credit risks: that of the protection buyer of the smaller maturity CDS contract not paying all of his protection fees between T 0 and T 1 and that of the protection seller not paying the loss-given-default, in particular for default occuring before T 1 , when this payment should compensate the loss-givendefault payment the arbitrageur himself should make. In other words, the CVA of the arbitrage strategy will make its initial value negative instead of 0. Unaccounted counterparty credit risks to be borne by a would-be arbitrageur can thus help to explain the existence of the significant and persistent amount of CDS-term-structure arbitrage in our study. We note in this respect that Brigo and Capponi (2014, [7] ) show in an example that the impact of CVA on the Mark-to-Market value of a 5-year single-name CDS payer contract can vary up to 60 basis points, depending on the default correlation between the two parties.
In addition, other types of valuation adjustments can also explain the arbitrage opportunities observed in our study in form of implicit costs and risks. For example, the counterparty credit risk run by the arbitrageur may be alleviated through the posting of collateral (e.g. in a context of centrally cleared contracts) but the arbitrageur himself would then have to post collateral also, which then corresponds to a non-zero initial investment. Furthermore, liquidity risks might prevent the arbitrageur to prematurely close-out his position. Biswas (2015, [4] ) studied the liquidity risk component in a real-world setting, as measured by the bid-ask spread for CDS contracts, based on mainly post-crisis CDS market data. They found that the liquidity risk premiums for CDS contracts are between 12 and 14 basis points depending on whether the contracts are between a dealer and another dealer or between dealer and a buy-side investor. they also found that an entity with lower credit rating has to pay higher liquidity premiums. Since we use data from the time period leading to and during the financial crisis, we expect the liquidity premiums for our mainly dealer and buy-side investors (or end-users) trades to be higher than these numbers.
Conclusions & Research Directions
We derived criteria for absence of arbitrage in CDS term structures, under various assumptions (discrete or continuous protection payments, interest rate environments which are positive or not) with no or only minimal modelling assumptions. These criteria provide simple checks for arbitrage opportunities in the CDS market. Based on these criteria and using a comprehensive data set, we found that a significant amount of CDS-term-structure arbitrage opportunities existed in the CDS market prior and during the financial crises.
Violation of the no-arbitrage conditions implies nonsensical conditional default probabilities which will impact on the calculation of CVA and DVA. The existence of such arbitrage opportunities is likely to be connected with hidden risks (counterparty credit risk, liquidity risk) and costs (collateral) which prevents them to be exploited, and which prior to the 2007-09 crises were not systematically taken into account in the pricing of OTC derivatives.
The progress being made in the theory and practice of the valuation adjustment should contribute to the gradual disappearance of these arbitrage opportunities, as should the increase in efficiency and transparency due to the standardisation of OTC derivative contracts and the use of modern information technology. Furthermore, central clearing should contribute to greater liquidity. The existence of arbitrage opportunities should therefore not discourage the financial community from continuing to use the CDS market for the calibration of counterparty default risks.
As possible directions for future research we mention the expansion of our study to maturity pairs other than the four we considered here, and other data sets. We also believe that our analysis can be extended to cover sovereign CDS while accounting for the exchange rate between the protection and premium legs in context of the so-called Quanto CDS; no study has been done on the term-structure arbitrage of such contracts. On a theoretical level, it would be interesting to characterise arbitrage-free CDS term structures: we mention here that one can construct examples of CDS curves which satisfy the criteria of theorems 1 and 2, but which nevertheless cannot be a CDS curve in an arbitrage-free model. This is work in progress.
In particular, the forward IRS curve uniquely determines the forward bond prices. 
is an increasing function on (T 0 , ∞).
Proofs. The corollary follows by inserting (13) into (11) . The proof of (13) we set up and solve an ODE for the forward bond prices. We fix T 0 , and write I(T) for I 0 (T 0 , T) and F(T) for F 0 (T 0 , T).
On dividing both sides of the fundamental relation (10) by P 0,T 0 , we can rewrite this as This as a linear non-homogeneous ODE for F(T) for T > T 0 with initial condition F(T 0 ) = 1, whose solution is given by (13) .
We make some further observations:
1. In a dynamic setting relations such as the ones established here hold between s t (T 0 , T) and/or P t,T and I t (T 0 , T) and put restrictions on a joint dynamic CDS-IRS model which simultaneously tries to mode the swap and CDS rates. One can ask for a relationship between the f 0,T 's and the forward swap rates I(T) = I 0 (T 0 , T).
Recall that above. (2) The DV01 for this strategy is between -103 and -11 dollars throughout the data period in our sample; whereas, the CR01 for this strategy is between 4,761 and 4,870 dollars for the sample period. Clearly, CR01 or credit risk instead of DV01 or interest rate risk is the main driver for the MtM for this strategy. (3) We note that, the above observation can be generalized to all singlename CDS; i.e., interest rate sensitivity for single-name CDSs is much smaller than credit spread risk with regard to their respective rates.
